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1. The new frontiers of flexicurity  after Lisbon 
Initially the subject of theoretical debate and then summed up in an 
original linguistic formula, the concept of “flexicurity” represents the 
fascinating oxymoron which has inspired much of the European 
Employment Strategy (EES) since the Council of Luxembourg. Embracing 
the pillars of employability, adaptability and entrepreneurship, the 
attempt has been to achieve a notion of “soft” flexibility
1 that guarantees 
workers'  rights of access to opportunities in education and training and 
at the same time paves the way towards modernising the organisation of 
labour, not least by redefining flexible forms of contract within the 
framework of acceptable security standards. In this context, the EES 
assigns a key role to the "most adaptable" types of contract, which imply 
an internal differentiation in the traditional model of subordinate 
employment, with the dual aim of enhancing the productivity and 
competitiveness of enterprises and ensuring adequate levels of job 
security for the workers involved.  
It is only recently, however, that forms of employment that combine 
flexibility and security have become synonyms of "quality work". Since 
the European Council in  Lisbon, in March 2000 and Stockholm in March 
2001 a new, ambitious strategic objective has emerged: that of 
modernising the European social model
2 by investing in people and 
building an active social state; according to the conclusions drawn by the 
President of the Lisbon Council, this objective can be achieved by 
developing a knowledge-based economy, in which the providing of 
employment for all does not mean concentrating exclusively on the 
creation of new jobs but also on better jobs, and it is in this perspective 
that the European Union proposes to define common approaches to 
maintain and improve the quality of work as one of the general aims of 
employment policies. The search for quality in work
3 finds a concrete 
form in a series of “horizontal objectives” to be pursued in all intervention 
by EU institutions regarding both the characteristics of employment, and 
thus the inherent quality of jobs, and the mechanisms regulating the 
labour market, with reference to issues such as integration and access to 
the labour market, gender equality, flexibility, certainty of employment, 
etc. As emerges from indications given by the European Commission, if it 
                                                 
1 See Caruso 2000a, 141 ff. 
2 On the evolution of the European social model from the Second World War to the present 
and the distribution of competencies in Europe between the supranational community and 
the member states as regards social policy, see the interesting reconstruction by Giubboni 
2001, 26 and ff. For a reflection on the future development of the European social model, 
see also Scharpf 2002, 645; Streeck 2000, 3; Trubek, Mosher  2001. 
3 COM (2001) 313 del 20.6.2001, 9. THE REGULATION OF TEMPORARY WORK IN THE LIGHT OF FLEXICURITY 3 
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is taken to mean precariousness, uncertainty, or mediocre employment 
with no prospects, flexibility should be considered as a “negative value” 
to be avoided. Although the discussion here will be confined to the 
implications as far as adaptability is concerned, it should be pointed out 
that this turning point has tightened the margins of the compromise 
behind the strategy adopted to weaken labour market constraints: the 
aim of reconciling flexibility and security has to be seen no longer, or  not 
only, as  a necessary combination of the two terms in which  “security” 
has to be reconciled with and adapted to the superior claims of 
“flexibility”, but – with a view to achieving the quality mentioned above – 
has much stronger and more radical implications, that is, that  flexible 
employment of quality  is either “secure” in the sense that it guarantees 
adequate social protection for workers in a context of continuous change 
or, more simply, does not exist.  
Limiting the notion of flexibility to the narrower context of the so-
called atypical forms of employment, the aim of this paper is to identify 
and analyse a number of possible profiles of security that can be achieved 
on the basis of the indications contained in EU policy and legislation in 
relation to a certain type of contract: temporary work
4. The starting point 
for reflection on the possible mechanisms by which this can be achieved 
is given in particular by the process of drawing up the discipline 
regulating the conditions of employment of temporary workers, the 
subject of a  recent Directive proposal presented by the European 
Commission on March 20th 2002 and subsequently modified in the 
November of the same year
5. 
Analysis of the procedure with which this discipline was drawn up is of 
particular interest for reflection on the new trends, modalities and 
protagonists of the process of social integration in Europe. Through the 
Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC)
6 EU institutions and member states 
have converged on the necessity of achieving important objectives in 
                                                 
4 The notion of temporary work, or travail intèrimaire, as outlined in proposals for EU 
regulations from the late 1970s onwards and used on the following pages, does not always 
coincide, in the various member states, with a broader notion of temporary work: in some 
countries, such as the United Kingdom, the expression temporary work usual embraces, in 
fact, various forms of temporary work through agencies,  casual work and seasonal work. 
For the terminology used in the United Kingdom, see Hepple 1993, 263. For a survey of 
European experiences, see Carabelli 1999, 33 and ff.; Veneziani 1993, 278 and ff. 
5 See European Commission, COM (2002) 149, 20.3.2002 and the subsequent proposal of a 
modified Directive, COM (2002) 701, 28.11.2002. 
6 On the   “new open method of co-ordination” see Barbera 2000, 145 and ff.; Hodson, 
Maher 2002, 719 and ff. On the new model of governance and repercussions on the process 
of constraint in social Europe, see also Teague 2001, 7 and ff. 4                                                           LOREDANA ZAPPALÀ 
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employment policy. However, many of the doubts raised
7 concerning the 
possible scenarios of future social policy seem doomed to remain partially 
unsolved; one particular doubt is whether the OMC is a mask hiding an 
attitude of renunciation or at least an absence of action by EU institutions 
concerning social issues; or, more simply, ineffective, given its incapacity 
as an instrument to have real influence on national dynamics
8; or, 
currently, the only possible way to create an "umbrella" that is suitable 
for all member states while respecting their inherent diversities; or, 
finally, only a transient mechanism that can open up the way to 
traditional modes of regulation
9. 
From this point of view, the concept of flexicurity and the possibility of 
achieving it in the context of temporary work provides a wealth of topics 
for debate: it acts, in fact, as an observatory on the various sources of 
regulation interwoven in the EU legal system, in particular the dynamics 
of interaction between regulation via the OMC and traditional forms of 
regulation. As will be seen, part of the doctrine
10 has claimed the need to 
strengthen the objectives of the EES by establishing hard  precepts in 
social legislation. However, as will emerge from the various sources of 
regulation concerning temporary work – guidelines  and proposals for 
directives – it can be pointed out that the system of sources has reached 
such a level of complexity that it no longer boils down to the simple 
dichotomy of guidelines-soft law and directives-hard law. In the following 
paragraphs it will be observed that the interweaving of two types of 
regulation concerning a single topic may give rise to a sort of circular 
process in which legislative prescriptions which are increasingly acquiring 
the features of soft law need to be interpreted in coherence with the 
objectives pursued by the European Union by means of the EES. 
 
2. Between co-ordination and harmonisation 
In an interesting essay written a few years ago, in which he 
conducted a detailed analysis of the relationship between employment 
                                                 
7 De La Porte, Pochet 2002, 15 and ff. 
8 This is the conclusion reached by Lo Faro 2002, 533 and ff. 
9 This is the scenario foreseen in particular by Hodson, Maher 2001, 719 and ff. Also 
partially critical of the OMC is the stand taken by Scharpf 2002, 645 and ff. ; while 
recognising the importance of the method to create convergence on strategic objectives for 
the Union, he expresses great doubts as to the real possibility of using the OMC alone to 
solve the lack of symmetry between the process of economic integration and the process of 
social integration. 
10 The prospect of strengthening the EES through social legislation is supported by Goetschy 
2001, 151 ff.; Bercusson 2001, 101 ff. On the connections between the European 
Employment Strategy and  EC Labour Law after Amsterdam, see the interesting 
reconstruction by Bruun 2001, 309 ff.. THE REGULATION OF TEMPORARY WORK IN THE LIGHT OF FLEXICURITY 5 
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policy
11 and labour law, Mark Freedland highlighted the several different 
aims interwoven in EU regulations. He remarks that the whole history of 
European Community employment law has been linked to the possibility 
of legitimising Community intervention in terms of economic and/or social 
policy
12, but at the same time stresses the fact that the process of   
juridification of Community labour law has always been permeated by 
employment policy aims that do not always coincide with those of social 
policy.  The two terms, in fact, cannot be considered to be synonymous 
as the aim of social policy is the creation of a network of minimum 
unalienable rights, whereas employment policy has always pursued 
objectives directly connected with regulating the labour market and, in 
particular, creating and maintaining employment and promoting 
professional and vocational training. In short, according to Freedland, 
employment policy can be considered to be connected to a broader 
sphere of reference comprising  active labour market policy
13 in which 
economic policy e social policy are indissolubly linked in a single discourse 
which has only recently been enshrined in Title VIII of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam
14.  
Atypical forms of employment, along with the issue of equal 
opportunities, are one of the most important areas in which it is possible 
to find a superimposition of topics dealt with  – in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam - in Title VIII concerning employment policies and Title XII on 
social policies
15; for this reason, a single issue may well at the same time 
be the subject of procedures of co-ordination and legislation oriented 
towards  harmonisation. This possibility appears to be confirmed by a 
glance at the latest products of Community social law: from Directives on 
part-time  and fixed-term contracts to those concerning new forms of 
discrimination, it appears evident that the objectives of the EES have 
become increasingly intertwined with the aims pursued by means of 
social legislation. Therefore, although the “neo-voluntaristic” model 
                                                 
11 Freedland 1996a, 275 ff.  
12 See Freedland 1996a, 287. 
13 On this topic, see also Deakin, Reed 2000, 83. 
14 On the employment policy pursued after the Council of Essen as a compromise between 
the requirements expressed in the White Papers and Green Paper of the Commission quoted 
above, see the analysis made by Freedland 1996a, 297 ff.; finally, on the balance between 
employment policy, economic policy and  social policy, see Bercusson 2001, 101 ff., and 
Ashiagbor 2001, 313 ff. , who stresses that employment has become a central issue in 
Community policies, above all with a view to supporting economic and monetary policies; on 
Title VIII of the Tce see Sciarra 1999b, 157 ff. 
15 In relation to this, see Barbera 2000, 137; Szyszczak 2000, 197 ff.; Szyszczak 2001, 
1160, who points out that the new paradigm of social policy after Amsterdam and in 
particular the positions taken on the subject of flexibility have greatly influenced the 
European legislative agenda. 6                                                           LOREDANA ZAPPALÀ 
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excludes (Article 129 Tce) the possibility of soft law measures adopted 
via the open method of co-ordination leading to harmonisation of the 
legislative and regulatory provisions of the member states, it must be 
pointed out that the convergence between the contents of some 
guidelines and the objectives pursued in the Title on social policy relating 
to certain spheres of intervention (Arts. 136-137) has led to a 
hybridisation of the regulatory techniques applied in several fields. As 
observed above (§ 1), a more direct connection between the EES and 
social legislation has been supported with a view to strengthening – if not 
actually transforming into hard law - objectives which, through the co-
ordination procedure,  are rarely being implemented in national plans of 
action, as well as to eliminating the persistent lack of symmetry between 
the stage reached in the process of economic integration and the as yet 
incomplete process of social integration
16.  
The progressive hybridisation of social law by the insertion into EU 
directives of objectives "typical" of employment policies has a whole 
series of consequences: on the one hand, the directives tend to become, 
among other things, tools whereby the EES can be implemented, thus 
placing stronger constraints on member states to implement the 
Commission guidelines; and on the other hand, the directives themselves 
are affected by an extension of the traditional aims of social legislation, 
but at the same time they borrow from the co-ordination procedure a 
reduced power to harmonise existing member state legislation. 
Atypical forms of employment are among the objectives of both the OMC 
and social legislation, and thus provide an opportunity to see whether 
and how the combination of these two regulatory tools – the new 
governance of which OMC is an expression and the old governance, or 
regulation by means of Directives - can achieve a blend of flexibility and 
security. In this sense, a reading of the directive proposal concerning 
working conditions for temporary workers offers various points for 
reflection. The effect of the hybridisation between the EES and social 
legislation is to transform the so-called "second-generation" directives, in 
both form and substance.  
i) From  the point of view of substance, it emerges that articulation of 
the discipline in fieri concerning temporary work is pervaded by a dual 
core: on the one hand, it is inspired by aims of social policy in the 
establishment of a network of protection and rights for temporary 
workers; on the other, it proposes aims of employment policy by 
provisions expressly oriented towards promoting the efficient functioning 
of the labour market. On certain points, the two cores of the Directive are 
                                                 
16 This, in particular,  is the position taken by Scharpf 2002, 662 ff.  THE REGULATION OF TEMPORARY WORK IN THE LIGHT OF FLEXICURITY 7 
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so close that the social policy objectives tend to be eclipsed by the 
crushing presence of employment policy aims
17. 
ii)  From the formal point of view, on the other hand,  the proposal 
features a series of tools of an increasingly soft  nature in which the 
harmonisation function is reduced to a minimum in favour of the 
provision of general, more or less binding, principles, as well as laying 
emphasis on a different way of co-ordinating national regulations, in the 
awareness that solutions are to be sought and flexibly adapted in relation 
to the different regulatory requirements of the various member states. As 
in the two previous Directives on atypical jobs,  it appears clear that the 
Union does not propose to regulate the subject directly but to provide 
states with a possible model for the re-regulation
18 of national systems. 
Alongside the provision of a series of protection measures, which still 
leave states a certain amount of discretion as to their implementation, 
some of the indications contained in the proposed Directive – above all 
those inspired by employment aims - have an essentially propulsive and 
qualifying role
19, actively encouraging structural reform of the labour 
market and the connected national systems of social protection without, 
however, taking on any further direct regulatory commitment (or at least 
only minimal commitment). In this context, the EU is thus taking the role 
of a catalyst for change
20, activating a process of  persuasion that will 
encourage states to "rethink" their social policy
21 in relation to pursuing 
certain key objectives towards which it has been decided that national 
systems should converge.  
Given these characteristics, the proposed Directive on temporary 
work and the complex process of approving it, which recently witnessed 
the failure of dialogue between the social partners and then the start of 
heated institutional debate, offers – as said previously and as will become 
clearer later on - a good starting point for a discussion of the strength, 
effectiveness and possible contents of the concept of flexicurity, as well 
                                                 
17 For a critical interpretation of recent developments in the EES and the re-dimensioning of 
social policy in favour of an approach that gives almost absolute priority to employment 
creation, see Ashiagbor 2001, 311 ff. 
18 On labour law becoming “a new word in national and European juridical discourse” when 
it “becomes synonymous with re-regulation, accepting the challenge of flexibility” see 
Sciarra 1999a, 373. 
19 Giubboni 2001, 94; Kenner 1999, 415 ff. More generally, on the new models of 
Community intervention in social policy, see Streeck 1996, 64 ff. who speaks, in reference 
to social legislation that leaves member states various modes of implementation, of 
governance by choice. 
20 Giubboni 2001, 94 and Rhodes 1998, 48. 
21 In this sense, see Szyszczak 2000, 201. See also Ferrera, Hemerijck, Rhodes 2000, 741. 8                                                           LOREDANA ZAPPALÀ 
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as the persistent difficulties, both theoretical and practical, connected 
with regulation of the social sphere in Europe.  
 
 
3. Temporary work and the European Union: the 
“resistible” ascent of Community regulation of atypical 
jobs 
As emerged from a recent study by the European Foundation in 
Dublin
22 - on which the proposed Directive mentioned above is based
23 - 
temporary work has increased considerably in the last ten years. Despite 
its spread, the study showed that the general quality of temporary work 
and the prevailing working conditions are still considerably worse than 
the status of workers with a standard employment contract.  
In the light of this reference context, it is clear that temporary work 
has been the focus of Community action, both via the open co-ordination 
procedure, as a tool for adaptable  job creation, and in order to issue a 
harmonisation directive that will guarantee minimum working condition 
standards for the workers involved.  The two perspectives connected with 
regulation of temporary work, i.e. increasing employment and ensuring a 
system of worker protection by limiting abuse connected with recourse to 
it, have been at the centre of the debate that witnessed the failure of 
social dialogue between the Unice and the Etuc
24. As a consequence, in 
March 2002, acting in its role as gatekeeper of the legislative initiative
25, 
and aware of the impossibility of any further delay in introducing 
regulations, the Commission presented the above-mentioned directive 
proposal. While on the one hand, it partially reflects the points of 
convergence reached by the social partners, on the other it does not 
seem to be fully capable of reconciling the divergences which had 
resulted in an impasse in the social dialogue, thus giving rise to dissent 
by both employers' and workers' associations.  On the basis of various 
amendments proposed first by the Economic and Social Committee
26 and 
then by the European Parliament
27, the Commission subsequently 
intervened, as allowed by Article 250 Tce, c. 2, modifying the proposal in 
                                                 
22 Storrie 2002, Temporary work in the European Union, European Foundation for the 
improvement of living and working conditions, Dublin, 27 ff. 
23 See the Explanatory memorandum  preceding the proposal, p. 2. 
24 See Jones 2002, 183 ff. 
25 On this point, see Schmidt 1997, 6. On the role of the Commission, see also Teague 
2001, 13. 
26 See Ces 1027/2002 , 19.09.2002. 
27 See Resolution PE n. 14331/02, 20.11.2002. THE REGULATION OF TEMPORARY WORK IN THE LIGHT OF FLEXICURITY 9 
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partial acceptance of the points raised by the Parliament. It is on the 
basis of the new proposal that the co-decision procedure laid down in the 
Treaty
28 will proceed in the coming months.  
It may, however, be useful to consider the process whereby the 
directive was drawn up, in order to analyse, through the combination of 
EES guidelines and legislation via directives, the strength of the concept 
of flexicurity and its contents.  
In particular, it is already clear that the prevailing aim in formulating 
the proposal was a promotional one, whose effect was to blend the 
objectives of guaranteeing minimum standards of treatment with those of 
favouring the spread of temporary work contracts. Despite opposition by 
Etuc during negotiations, the mediation role taken by the Commission 
does not imply supine acceptance of the pressure that employers 
certainly brought to bear, but rather  an informed choice dictated by 
coherence with the aims of the EES. The aim of promoting temporary 
work in the proposal does not, in fact, appear to contradict the ratio of 
the previous agreement on fixed-term contracts, nor the concept of 
“flexibility and security” which inspired a number of Commission 
guidelines. What emerges from the proposal is enhancement of the role 
played by temporary work agencies, in the sense that they are implicitly 
considered to be tools that will contribute towards creating work 
opportunities for outsiders who have a “real” preference for temporary 
work. There are, however, signs of awareness of the fact that that 
temporary work – as stated on p. 5 of the Explanatory Memorandum – 
will not be able to act as a driving force for the creation of jobs unless it 
provides sufficient guarantees for workers and the unemployed, that is, 
unless it offers quality employment that will compensate for its temporary 
nature. Reading of the directive's measures aiming to achieve 
employment policy objectives can therefore not neglect the strengthening 
of social policy aspects underlying the employment strategy; the direct 
reference to quality work in the Consideranda, objectives and tools to be 
used to promote permanent employment therefore leads the reader to 
view this aim as being the key to the inspiration behind the whole of the 
directive.  
In coherence with  the objectives and provisions pursued by the EES, 
the aims outlined in the proposal can therefore be viewed as implying a 
rejection of pressing requests by the supporters of laissez-faire who 
invoke flexibility, in the form of deregulation, as the only way to defeat 
                                                 
28 On the procedure of co-decision, see Shackleton 2000, 325; Schmidt 1997; Farrel, 
Héritier 2001. 10                                                           LOREDANA ZAPPALÀ 
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mass unemployment in Europe
29. It is obviously beyond the scope of this 
paper to conduct a thorough examination of the economic and social 
reasons for the need for legal regulation of work contracts
30; mention can 
be made, however, of the circumstance whereby the prescriptions 
contained in the proposal, aiming at establishing an adequate framework 
for the use of temporary work, can prevalently be identified with the aims 
of “social regulation” and what is called “competitive regulation”
31, in 
which economic and social objectives are blended. Therefore, far from 
invoking a deregulatory drift which would had an adverse effect on the 
spread and social acceptability  of this type of contract, the aim of the 
proposal is to encourage member states to adopt regulations that will 
guarantee an adequate (normative) framework by means of a series of 
labour standards, the substantial, procedural and promotional
32 contents 
of which are directed towards economic efficiency and social equity.  
If, therefore, it appears evident that the employment perspective 
pervades the whole proposal, it will be of greater interest to see whether 
and how the trend towards a strategy of flexibility has been concretely 
balanced  with counterweights and tools that will at the same time 
guarantee security. It is, in fact, in identifying these counterweights that 
the theoretical and practical difficulty of drawing up the discipline 
emerges. Whereas the OMC has led to broad convergence by member 
states on the contents and importance of the guidelines oriented towards 
a model of “flexibility and security”, the concrete establishment of the 
quantum and the modus whereby this security can be guaranteed led, as 
we have seem, to failure in the dialogue between the social partners and 
then to conflict between the European Commission and  Parliament. 
 
                                                 
29 Debate on this issue is vast and the various stands taken cannot be summarised here. 
See Siebert 1997, 33 ff. for a survey of the view that the roots of unemployment lie in the 
rigidity of the European labour market; see also Pierson, Forster, Jones 1997, 5 ff, for an 
analysis of the problem of unemployment in Europe that considers not only the rigidity of 
the labour market but also a broad series of contributory factors. Finally, for a highly critical 
stance against uncontrolled deregulation and exportation of the American model as a pre-
packed recipe to fight unemployment,  cf.  Deakin, Reed 2000, 71 ff. and Ashiagbor 2001,  
311, who maintain that the unique character of European unemployment requires an ad hoc 
European solution.  
30 In general on the theories and social and economic  aims of regulation, see Ogus 1994. 
On regulation of the labour market and work relations to guarantee efficiency and 
competitiveness, see Deakin 2001, 17 ff., Deakin, Reed 2000, 83 ff., Collins 2000, 3 ff., 
Collins 2001a, 29 ff.  
31 See Collins 2001b, 218 ff.  
32 On the types of standards mentioned, see Deakin, Wilkinson 1999. THE REGULATION OF TEMPORARY WORK IN THE LIGHT OF FLEXICURITY 11 
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4. The enigmatic requirement to review prohibitions 
and restrictions as laid down by Article 4 of the 
proposal 
Although quality work and flexicurity are objectives that inspire the 
whole discipline, the proposal does not dictate prescriptive models 
whereby these objectives can be achieved, but confines itself to providing 
minimum indications as to some aspects regarding the quality of work 
(relating to the principle of non-discrimination, training, etc.). So 
although the social policy aims pursued are evident, the lack of clear 
indications as to the elements that will ensure security gives rise to a 
whole series of doubts as to how to interpret its real meaning and the 
sphere of action of the employment policy-inspired measures  the 
directive contains; these doubts will bring great pressure to bear on the 
system if and when the provisions promoting contracts are not 
interpreted coherently with the aims behind the social legislation 
accompanying the EES, as well as a systematic reading of the guidelines 
supplied by Commission and the most recent results obtained by the 
OMC. 
One of the most problematic areas in this respect is represented by 
Article 4, which is entirely inspired by employment policy objectives. The 
article states that “Prohibitions or restrictions on the use of temporary 
work are justified only on grounds of general interest relating in particular 
to the protection of temporary workers, the requirements of health and 
safety at work and the need to ensure that the labour market functions 
properly and abuses are prevented.  The Member States, after consulting 
the social partners (…), shall review any restrictions or prohibitions 
mentioned above in order to verify whether they are justified on the 
grounds given in paragraph 1. If not, the Member States shall discontinue 
them. The Member States shall inform the Commission of the results of 
that review.” (cc. 1 and  2). 
It seems undeniable that this provision is an expression of the desire 
to remove - in member states where similar legislation is in force - 
constraints which limit the spread of temporary work. The category of 
limits most likely to be affected will be those whose aim is to avoid the 
de-structuring of standard jobs: that is, limits aiming to prevent recourse 
to temporary work in order to fill posts connected with ordinary, stable 
production activity. Whereas in some countries, for example the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Holland, or Sweden, there exist at will supply 
contracts, i.e. with no limitations,  and so it is unlikely to be necessary  to 
revise any restrictions, other countries such as France, Spain and Italy 12                                                           LOREDANA ZAPPALÀ 
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possess various types of limits on the stipulation of contracts for the 
supply of labour.  
The attempt to prevent de-structuring steady jobs – as shown in 
countries where the system is inspired by this ratio – can be made 
through several possible “antidotes” to flexibility: a range of regulatory 
devices mainly based on the common leitmotif that a contract to supply 
labour can only be legitimately stipulated when the employer has 
temporary requirements. In some systems, for example, in France,  there 
is both a general rule prohibiting temporary work from providing stable 
employment connected with the ordinary, permanent activity of the 
company involved, and a series of considerations identifying the 
individual instances of possible recourse to temporary work. In Spain, the 
temporary nature of employment is intrinsically linked to specific types of 
work established by law. In Italy, the types of temporary employment are 
established both by law and/or collective bargaining, and by the ratio 
behind certain specific prohibitions. In these systems, to protect the 
central role of steady employment,  there are also further limits on 
supply contracts, concerning their duration (that is, the duration of single 
contracts and/or the possible of renewal, as well as the maximum 
number of renewals for labour supply contracts) and the maximum 
percentage of temporary contracts an employer can stipulate. 
Faced with such a profoundly different regulatory panorama, the 
proposal chooses to remain silent: neither in the Consideranda nor in the 
single provisions is it possible to find a preference for one or the other 
kinds of regulation. However, in the following pages the attempt will be 
made to provide an interpretation of the provision that is coherent with 
the objectives pursued by the EU within the framework of the EES. 
 
5. The requirement to review limits in various national 
contexts: the need for a systematic interpretation to 
avoid “short circuiting” 
Although, as we have seen, reading between the lines of the proposal 
gives a glimpse of the desire on the part of EU institutions to promote the 
recourse to temporary work in Europe, on account of its obvious potential 
to increase employment, seeing only this would be a serious mistake and 
would give a misleading view of the much more complex ratio behind the 
proposal.  
The provision made in Article 4 regarding the revision of restrictions is 
evidently one of the most symptomatic expressions of the aims of 
employment policy which presupposes, in both form and substance, a 
hybridisation of social legislation and the Open Method of Co-ordination. THE REGULATION OF TEMPORARY WORK IN THE LIGHT OF FLEXICURITY 13 
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Its aim is not to establish minimum standards of protection for the 
workers involved, but  – through a soft  formulation of the indications 
given to member states, imitating the contents of the guidelines – to 
provide input for more efficient regulation of the temporary labour market 
in accordance with the objectives of the EES. For this reason, as 
mentioned previously, it is this provision that may cause difficulties of 
interpretation if it is not seen as strengthening and completing the 
employment strategy. In connection with this, it should be recalled that 
all the provisions in the proposal, including the one inviting member 
states to review existing restrictions and prohibitions, are to be read in 
the light of the objective behind the whole discipline and the recent 
evolution of the EES, that is, the achievement of   flexible work of quality 
in the sense outlined above. Only in the light of this basic idea – through 
a teleological-systematic interpretation - is it possible to understand the 
general plan of the proposal and its various aims: to achieve greater 
efficiency in the labour market and more flexible management of the 
workforce, but at the same time to guarantee adequate levels of security. 
According to these aims, which are summed up in the notion of quality 
temporary work, member states should find a new way of viewing 
flexibility that will reject the binary logic of a trade-off  between 
“efficiency” and “social justice”
33. As we have seen, the objective stated 
in Article 2, c. 2, i.e. the establishment of an adequate legal framework 
for the use of temporary work re-dimensions the potentially deregulatory 
scope that Article 4 would appear, prima facie, to have. In the 
Commission guidelines relating to adaptability, the tool used to guarantee 
an efficient labour market is not deregulation but re-regulation, which will 
take specific circumstances into account and, if necessary provide 
protection against the risk of malfunctioning of the labour market in the 
various member states. 
If, therefore, on the one hand the proposal is coherent with the aims 
of the EES in that it leans towards – but does not impose - a reduction in 
the “antidotes” to flexibility  that exist in the member states and can 
hinder efficient functioning of the market, on the other hand, by pursuing 
a high level of quality in temporary work it leaves it up to the states 
themselves to evaluate the "degree of tolerability", on the social plane, of 
the effects of partial deregulation of this type of contract.   
With Article 4 the Commission is trying to bring to light the degree of 
acceptance of greater flexibility by the member states. It clearly has no 
intention of attempting to harmonise national legislation: in the re-
regulation process the member states do not have to remove all 
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constraints and restrictions on temporary work tout court, but evaluate – 
in collaboration with the social partners - “in order to verify whether they 
are justified”: each system will therefore have to ascertain whether it 
possesses the necessary “antibodies” that will make greater flexibility 
tolerable and coherent with the aim of ensuring quality employment.  
In this sense, Article 4, cc. 1 and 2, state that restrictions and 
prohibitions are only justifiable "on grounds of general interest relating in 
particular to the protection of temporary workers, the requirements of 
health and safety at work and the need to ensure that the labour market 
functions properly and abuses are prevented". Nothing, however, is 
stated concerning the parameters with which the member states are to 
assess the degree of permanence of the reasons for legislative 
restrictions on temporary work. This apparent gap can, however, be 
bridged by the teleological-systematic hermeneutic operation mentioned 
above, which leads to an interpretation  of the prescriptions of EU law  in 
relation to the aim of the provision and coherently with the principles and 
objectives of the Treaty and the EES, the effectiveness of which – as we 
have seen - the directive aspires to strengthen. 
On this basis, the problem of interpretation is easily solved: there can 
be no deregulation without a blend of flexibility and security, flexibility 
and certainty of employment. The grounds of general interest, which 
mainly concern worker protection,  the health and safety requirements 
and/or the proper functioning of the labour market, which will not allow 
member states to remove all limits on temporary work, should thus be 
identified as a lack of mechanisms to guarantee security in the labour 
market and/or in employment relationships. However, as regards 
evaluation of these grounds, member states are left free to choose the 
most suitable solution for the specific features of their markets and 
welfare systems. No uniformity is being sought but rather a “eulogy of 
differentiation”
34 and implicit recognition of the fact that in the various 
member states there may be several ways to combine flexibility and 
security, competitiveness and solidarity, by means of regulation that is 
economically sustainable, politically feasible and socially acceptable
35.  
It should, however, be pointed out that the decision not to impose 
hard  requirements in order to achieve an effective balance between 
flexibility and security in temporary work undoubtedly represents a failure 
to take the opportunity to develop EU social law, above all with a view to 
strengthening the numerous points in the guidelines that aim to prevent 
the possibility of a laissez-faire drift in market regulation and 
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employment relationships. The soft nature of Article 4, the rather volatile 
reference to grounds of general interest connected with worker protection 
or the need to ensure the proper functioning of the labour market, which 
amount to limits on the introduction of flexibility and/or deregulation in 
national systems, and even the more binding requirements laid down in 
the proposal (such as the principle of non-discrimination and the right to 
training) are, in fact, too weak and vague to assure that the blend of 
flexibility and security will be concretely achieved at all, still less in a way 
that can be monitored by the Court of Justice if and when implementation 
of the directive by the member states is to be ascertained. 
However, although no uniformity is imposed or even sought, thus 
giving member states great discretionar y  p o w e r ,  i t  i s  a l s o  t r u e  t h a t  
certain profiles of the flexibility/security combination do emerge from a 
systematic interpretation of the Commission guidelines in the framework 
of the EES and the (few) binding provisions contained in the proposal. 
Given the lack of binding models and requirements in the directive, it also 
appears to provide member states with an opportunity to co-operate, 
exchanging experiences and best practice, comparing themselves with 
each other - in accordance with the social policy benchmarking 
procedures outlined by the European Council in Lisbon in 2000
36 - on the 
basis of the indicators concerning the quality of employment supplied by 
the Commission: an exchange of experiences and good practice that is 
not the result of a top down imposition, but derives naturally from the 
initiatives taken by each single state (bottom up social benchmarking) 
which, in trying to combine flexibility and security in temporary work, 
may well be interested in imitating the best practice achieved in other 
member states. 
Recognising that there exist  a number of possible solutions and 
trade-offs in the various member states, the attempt will be made in the 
following pages to identify the counterweights, in terms of security,  that 
the proposal deems suitable to balance flexibility and render it 
sustainable.  
 
6. The possibility of accessing permanent employment 
A first feature which strengthens security for temporary workers can 
be identified in provisions facilitating access to permanent employment 
with the user company, which annul clauses whose effect is to prevent or 
limit such employment. In this sense, certain grounds of general interest 
concerning the protection of workers find specific limitations in the 
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proposal (Article 6, cc. 1 and 2): first of all, workers are to be informed of 
any vacancies occurring in the user company, so that they have the same 
opportunity as the other employees of the company to be given a 
permanent job (c. 1, cit.).  
Of particular interest is the apparently hard provision in c. 2  which 
invites member states to adopt “any action required to ensure that any 
clauses prohibiting or having the effect of preventing the conclusion of a 
contract of employment or an employment relationship between the user 
undertaking and the temporary worker after his posting are null and void 
or may be declared null and void”. As originally formulated, the provision 
required the annulment of both supply contract  clauses explicitly 
prohibiting the employment of workers by the user company, and clauses 
that can be agreed on by the agency and the worker or the agency and 
the user, outside the supply contract, to establish a temp-to-perm-fee or 
transfer fee, that is, compensation to be paid to the agency if a worker is 
taken on directly by the company at the end of the period of temporary 
work. Such clauses are already prohibited in several member states 
(Italy, France, Spain) whereas they are quite common in countries like 
the United Kingdom, Ireland and Finland. The economic ratio  behind 
these clauses is clear: it is in the interests of the agencies to keep the 
most capable and reliable workers, or those in whom they have invested 
in the form of training
37.  The provision of a temp-to-perm-fee in a supply 
contract is also an additional cost for an employer wanting to take on a 
worker permanently, and may discourage him from attempting to do so. 
However, this hard  provision, which seemed capable of guaranteeing 
security for temporary workers, was subsequently weakened by the 
introduction of a third clause to Article 6:  in implementation of an 
amendment by the European Parliament
38, it established that “This 
paragraph is without prejudice to provisions under which temporary 
agencies receive a reasonable level of recompense for services rendered 
to user undertakings for posting, recruitment and training of temporary 
workers”. Once again, therefore, the process of drawing up the discipline 
regulating temporary work seems to have missed the opportunity to use 
a  hard provision to promote profiles that will promote the blend of 
flexibility and security by favouring transition from temporary to steady 
employment. In addition, the reference to the reasonable level of 
recompense – unless the Court of Justice intervenes to clarify the matter 
                                                 
37 The ban on using temp-to-perm-fees  is one of the problems most focused on by the 
Regulatory Impact Assessment drawn up by the Department of Trade and Industry in April 
2002. 
38 PE 316.363, emend. n. 47 which makes explicit reference to the desire to legitimise the 
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– does not appear to be capable of protecting workers against possible 
abuse that could prevent or hinder them from being taken on by the user 
company, or reduce the opportunities for them to receive training, and 
thus risks jeopardising the quality work objectives behind the discipline in 
fieri. 
 
7. Training temporary workers 
Some aspects of security in the relationship between agencies and 
workers may also be necessary to facilitate their re-entry into the labour 
market once a temporary job is terminated. With a view to ensuring 
greater employability, these aspects mainly concern the training of 
temporary workers. In order to achieve quality work,  the learning culture 
is an essential tool, both for employers to increase the competitiveness of 
their firms in an economy increasingly based on knowledge, and for 
workers, for whom it represents a crucial substitute for stability in 
employment. In this sense, the right to gain access to ongoing 
professional training as set forth in Article 14 of the Nice Charter must be 
read in combination with Article 15 (the right to work), the contents of 
which have been identified with the right to have chances of work: on the 
basis of these provisions, the right to professional training can be 
considered as a "third generation" social right which will guarantee 
workers at least employment  security, if not job security
39.  The social 
right to training can therefore be identified as the right to be provided 
with the means to achieve economic self-sufficiency and improve one's 
capabilities
40. 
It is evident that the immediate effect of failure to regulate the 
training of temporary workers would be that of jeopardising the individual 
workers' employability and competitiveness on the labour market, with 
the risk of his falling into what has been defined
41 as the low skill bad job 
trap (which will limit his future prospects of employment by other firms, 
promotion, a higher salary, etc.); in the long term, on the other hand, 
the negative effect would be on the production of the collective asset 
represented by the professional capabilities of human resources. For this 
reason, the proposal intervenes – also using the numerous guidelines 
issued concerning employability - proposing the creation of a series of 
labour standards in training that will attenuate persistent inequalities and 
                                                 
39 On the role of training as a tool for security in a context featuring a multiplicity of 
precarious work experiences, see also Freedland 1996b, 119; on the “right to training” see 
also Sciarra 1996, 15. 
40 This notion recalls the broader concept of capability, on this point see Sen 1999;  Deakin, 
Wilkinson 2000, 317 ff.  
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unemployment even in a partially deregulated labour market and prevent 
a possible drift  towards  economic inefficiency
42. Article 6, c. 5 of the 
proposal states that “Member States shall take suitable measures or shall 
promote dialogue between the social partners, in accordance with their 
national traditions and practices in order to improve temporary workers' 
access to training in the temporary agencies, even in the periods between 
their postings, in order to enhance their career development and 
employability; and  improve temporary workers' access to training for 
user undertakings’ workers”.   
However, given the inevitable risk of opportunistic behaviour by 
agencies and/or employers, which may jeopardise an essential aspect of 
quality in temporary employment, it would have desirable for the 
directive to have adopted a "stronger" solution to guarantee professional 
training for these workers. Once again, however, the effective feasibility 
of a fundamental aspect of security on the labour market and in 
employment relationships capable of balancing greater flexibility has in 
fact  - thanks to the soft formulation of the requirement - been left up to 
the discretionary powers of the member states, thus missing an 
opportunity for concrete strengthening of one of the crucial objectives of 
the EES by social legislation. 
Of course it is to be hoped that member states will autonomously 
choose to adopt "strong" solutions to guarantee training opportunities for 
these workers: that is, despite the lack of a hard requirement, it is hoped 
that the invitation to “improve temporary workers' access to training” will 
be translated at a national level into an obligation for agencies or user 
companies to provide training. In this sense a best practice that could be 
imitated by member states can be found  in the Italian system. Article 5 
of Law n. 196/97, in fact, obliges supply companies to pay a contribution 
into a Fund set up by means of a trade union agreement, the main aim of 
which is the promotion and financing of training and retraining for 
temporary workers.  
 
8. The principle of non-discrimination and exceptions 
to it 
A recent study by Ciett
43 maintained that cost cutting, that is, the 
possibility of "saving" on wages, is not the main attraction for companies 
that take on temporary workers; and yet the data supplied by the Dublin 
Foundation in 2002, comparing the salaries of temporary workers and 
those of standard workers, would seem to contradict this statement. In 
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many cases – despite the presence in the various national systems of the 
principle of equal wages for equal work – temporary workers earn on 
average 17-32% less than those permanently employed by the user 
companies.  
Given the interests involved (the possibility of making temporary work 
contracts more "appetising" for employers, and also the need to ensure 
one of the fundamental aspects of quality work) it is clear why it was the 
principle of non-discrimination that caused the most heated clash 
between the trade unions, leading – as mentioned previously - to a 
breakdown in negotiations, and subsequently to some of the most 
significant amendments proposed by the European Parliament.  
The modified version of Article 5, c. 1 of the proposal contains a 
provision that only in part follows the provisions contained in Directives 
97/71 and 99/70. It states that “The basic working and employment 
conditions of temporary workers shall be, for the duration of their posting 
at a user undertaking, at least those that would apply if they had been 
recruited directly by that enterprise to occupy the same job”. The tertium 
comparationis is not, therefore, an “abstract model of a worker” but a 
concrete reference that can be identified with a worker employed by the 
user company who occupies a post identical or similar to that of the 
worker supplied by the temporary labour agency, taking into account 
seniority, qualifications and job description. With this, the Commission 
intended to put an end to the dispute which had led to a breakdown in 
the dialogue between the social partners concerning the so-called 
“comparative sphere”
44. The greatest sticking point which caused 
negotiations to stall was, in fact, the notion of a “comparable worker” to 
refer to in order to fulfil the equality requirement: while employers' 
organisations maintained that temporary workers should be entitled to 
the same wages as workers employed by the agencies, the trade unions  
were of the opinion that the comparison was to be made with permanent 
employees of the user companies doing the same or similar work. As 
mentioned earlier, the proposal embraces the stand taken by the trade 
unions, stating that the conditions o f  e m p l o y m e n t  m u s t  b e  a t  l e a s t  
identical to those a temporary worker would be offered if he were directly 
employed by the user company. The ratio behind this choice is clear and 
totally acceptable: with a view to eliminating the most despicable forms 
of competition between steady and temporary employment, the proposal 
states that it is not the precarious, occasional labour market, but rather 
the steady, guaranteed market that should establish the parameters for 
the wages to be paid to temporary workers, obviously according to the 
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normal variations between the various commercial sectors and 
professional categories. Once again, we have apparent confirmation of 
the fact that construction of the model regulating flexibility does not 
affect the central role occupied by stable, permanent employment. 
Although the proposal makes no explicit mention of this point, it is 
implicitly confirmed as the normal type of employment relationship. 
After stating the principle of equality in c. 1, in the following cc. 2, 3 
and 4 the proposal leaves room for a whole series of admissible 
exceptions. Some of these exceptions raise immediate doubts because, 
on the one hand, their effect is to weaken the solemnly announced 
principle of non-discrimination, and on the other they are in clear 
contrast with consolidated EU law forbidding direct discrimination, which 
has  more than once stated that different, even penalising, treatment for 
atypical work is admissible as long as it does not depend exclusively on 
the fact that the workers involved are non-standard.  
The first exception is to be found in c. 2, where member states are 
authorised, following consultation with the social partners, to derogate – 
as far as salaries are concerned - from the principle of equal treatment, 
only when temporary workers have a permanent contract with labour 
agencies and continue to be paid between one job and another
45. If the 
equality requirement is not to be deprived of all meaning, the provision 
obviously needs interpreting in a restrictive sense: that is, an exception 
can be made to the principle of equality only in relation to wages paid to 
workers between one job and another
46, given that in this case there 
would not be any comparable worker to refer to; when, on the other 
hand, a worker is sent back to the same or another user company, the 
equality requirement comes into full force again. Only in this sense is the 
exception justified, above all to favour an increase in temporary work in 
which a worker has a permanent contract with an agency. 
The second exception is made in c. 3 where it is stated that “Member 
States may, after consulting the social partners at the appropriate level, 
give them the option of upholding or concluding collective agreements 
which derogate from the principle established in paragraph 1 as long as 
an adequate level of protection is provided for temporary workers”. 
Providing for less cogent application of the principle of equality, this 
provision would allow - via collective autonomy - for “differentiated 
                                                 
45 In the modified version of the directive, the clause quoted is the result of partial   
acceptance of an amendment presented by the European Parliament (PE 316.363, emend. 
n. 40) which stressed the need to specify that the exception only referred to pay.  
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adaptation of the rules of labour law”
47 , which cannot but raise serious 
doubts. According to the logic of the proposal, the reason for collective 
autonomy to accept the application of “attenuated equality” for 
temporary workers is quite clear: the need to spread this type of contract 
in order to increase employment rates, for example in areas where 
unemployment levels are high or for specific categories of disadvantaged 
workers to be reinserted into the labour market (the long-term 
unemployed, etc.). This provision is without doubt one of the most 
emblematic examples of the hybridisation of the objectives of social 
legislation by the EES, and it also reveals the existence of potential, and 
perhaps not sufficiently pondered, negative effects: provisions like these, 
aiming at creating minimum protections standards, regarding equal pay, 
for example, may - in the effort to promote employment - become   
adaptable and open to differentiation in the various national contexts, 
thus leaving room for dangerous cracks to open up  despite the 
effectiveness of the certain principles firmly enshrined in the directive. A 
number of basic doubts remain, in fact, regarding this exception: how is 
it to be reconciled with the ratio  behind the directive, not to mention 
previous directives relating to atypical work, which is to prevent 
competition between temporary and standard workers exclusively based 
on the opportunity for cost cutting? On what conditions and with what 
guarantees of a real increase in employment levels will collective 
autonomy be able to authorise differentiated pay for temporary workers 
without jeopardising the objective of achieving quality in employment 
behind the whole directive? Which trade union will be considered to be 
sufficiently representative of the instances and interests of temporary 
workers when faced by a differentiation in pay involving and penalising 
these workers and thus adding less favourable working conditions than 
those enjoyed by standard workers to the precariousness and uncertainty 
of their situation? And again – given that the proposal does not mention 
the point – how, with what parameters, and in relation to what tertium 
comparationis will it be possible to determine “an adequate level of 
protection”
48?   
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48 This exception has also been positively assessed by the European Parliament, which even 
proposed an amendment (PE 316.363 emend. n. 41) strengthening even further the role of 
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partners to make exceptions to the principle of non-discrimination without the need for any 
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"adequate level of protection", which the Parliament considered to have the potential to 
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These and the many other doubts raised by the provision can 
obviously not be answered here. It can only be pointed out that collective 
autonomy is being called upon to play a difficult role; the social adequacy 
of the exceptions introduced will probably be assessed ex post, possibly 
on the basis of posthumous comparison between the advantages, in 
terms of employment, and the sacrifices imposed by the exception to the 
principle of non-discrimination. The provision is certainly bound to create 
a number of problems of application in the various member states, even 
though the reasons may be different.  Only in some systems is this 
exception to the principle of non-discrimination already applied: in 
Holland, for example, as mentioned above, the whole sector is covered by 
collective bargaining. As far as wages are concerned, two types of 
workers have been identified: school-leavers, holiday workers and the 
workers re-entering the labour market after a long period of 
unemployment on the one hand, and all other workers on the other. 
Whereas the principle of equal pay is applied to all those in the second 
category, those in the first may earn lower wages, on condition, however, 
that they can remain in this "disadvantaged" group up to a maximum of 
two months, after which they have to pass to the other group. It will be 
more difficult to apply the exception in other countries such as Italy 
where the Law currently in force, No. 196/97, does not provide for similar 
exceptions to the principle of equal treatment, or other countries, such as 
the United Kingdom, where for different reasons doubts have been raised 
as to the appropriacy of giving such an important role to collective 
bargaining, which is seen as a vehicle of rigidity, especially given that 
bargaining does not cover all sectors. For this reason, the United 
Kingdom has already proposed
49 more flexible mechanisms to allow for 
exceptions to the rule of equal treatment. 
Whereas the second exception to the rule of equal treatment has 
caused great perplexity, the third, contained in c. 4 of Article 5 
50 has led 
to harsh criticism. This exception has been censured by both trade 
                                                                                                                              
protection". The amendment was not, however, accepted by the Commission: in the 
modified 2002 proposal, the Commission decided to keep the reference to the need to 
guarantee an "adequate level of protection". 
49 See Explanatory Memorandum on European Community Legislation (7430/02 – 
COM(02)149) by the Department of Trade and Industry,  29 April 2002. 
50 This clause states that, along with the exceptions previously laid down  in clauses 2 and 3 
, “ Member States may, with regard to pay, provide that paragraph 1 shall not apply where 
a temporary worker works on an assignment or series of assignments with the same user 
enterprise in a post which, due to its duration or nature, can be accomplished in a period 
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unions
51 and the European Parliament
52 and the criticism – as mentioned 
above – is justified for a number of reasons. The clause refers to work 
done for a user company “in a post which, due to its duration or nature, 
can be accomplished in a period not exceeding six weeks”: here, 
therefore, the exception to the principle of equality is justified by the 
temporary nature of the requirements which induce a user company to 
stipulate a labour supply contract. Only temporary requirements – which, 
as stated, are not the only opportunity for recourse to temporary work in 
the EU perspective – can justify exceptions to the principle of equality by 
member states. There does not, however, appear to be any ratio in this 
provision that presupposes a combination of flexibility and security: the 
only ratio is to favour flexibility and a reduction in costs for companies 
taking on workers for temporary requirements, without any real benefits 
for the workers themselves. In particular, there does not appear to be 
any attempt to improve employment rates that would at least make the 
exception socially “tolerable”. It is obvious that for temporary 
requirements companies are almost forced to stipulate flexible contracts; 
in these cases, leaving aside, that is, the exception being discussed, a 
company would always have recourse to temporary (or fixed-term) 
contracts: if the economic conditions are also convenient, even better. 
Furthermore, the potential expansion of this exception risks jeopardising 
the whole foundation on which the ratio of the proposal is based: as 
emerged from the Dublin study, a large number of labour supply 
contracts go up to a maximum of thirty days. The clause also risks 
introducing an element of irrationality: whereas, as we have seen, Article 
4 seems to invoke controlled deregulation regarding certain restrictions, 
within the limits and in the ways outlined above,  the last part of Article 
5, clause 4  requires member states to take “appropriate measures with a 
view to preventing misuse in the application of this exception; that is, it 
requires direct regulation to prevent abuse but gives no indications as to 
the mechanisms to be used for this control to be achieved. It is likely that 
member states deciding to adopt the exception will have to introduce 
control mechanisms, if they do not already have any, regarding the 
reasons for recourse to temporary contracts and in particular the element 
of temporariness; they will also have to regulate the succession of supply 
contracts in such a way as to prevent abuse in the form of fraudulently 
side-stepping the six-week limit but still being able to pay temporary 
workers less.  Finally, it should be pointed out that the exception makes 
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no mention of how pay rates for temporary workers are to be established, 
the level of protection that has to be guaranteed, and the "comparable 
worker" to whom reference is to be made. For the reasons briefly outlined 
above, it is clear that the exception opens up a dangerous gap in the 
temporary work discipline being approved, thwarting the whole principle 
of non-discrimination, along with the broader objective of achieving work 
of quality.  As stated in the reasons for the amendments presented by 
the European Parliament
53, in fact, if adopted in its current form the 
exception would completely jeopardise the impact and efficacy of the 
directive. It is no coincidence that, in monitoring the rationality and social 
sustainability of the exceptions to the principle of equality for temporary 
workers, the Parliament promoted further strengthening of the possibility 
for collective bargaining to introduce exceptions, as already provided for 
in clause 3, including the possibility of exceptions for contracts of a 
limited duration. Unexpectedly, however, the Commission – by means of 
the modified proposal presented in November 2002 - decided not to 
widen the sphere of action of collective autonomy and also to maintain 
the general exception for contracts lasting less than six weeks. It seems 
likely, however, that the strong dissent voiced by the European 
Parliament will draw out the process of completing this directive for quite 
some time. 
For the time being, however, one remark should be made: the 
exceptions to the principle of equality, and more generally the whole 
process of establishing the regulations, would seem to show that the 
employment-promoting objectives of the EES have the potential to impair 
and weaken the aim of providing minimum standards of protection for 
temporary workers, which is becoming increasingly soft and adaptable, 
depending on different national contexts and dynamics. In this respect as 
well, therefore, despite the objectives stated in the Consideranda and 
Article 2, the proposal unfortunately represents a failure by the Union to 
strengthen and  render effective those aspects aiming at improving the 
quality of work provided for in the most recent developments of the 
employment strategy following Lisbon.  
 
9. The non regression clause as a constraint on the 
soft provisions of the directive 
To conclude this analysis the concept of flexibility and security in 
temporary work, through the development and interweaving in the EU 
system of various sources of regulation, it is worthwhile devoting some 
space to the “non regression clause” which concludes the proposal being 
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examined, according to a tradition consolidated in a number of directives 
drawn up in the 1990s. After confirming the possibility for member states 
to introduce more favourable provisions for workers, clause 2 of Article 9 
states that “The implementation of this Directive shall under no 
circumstances constitute sufficient grounds for justifying a reduction in 
the general level of protection of workers in the fields covered by this 
Directive”; the clause goes on to grant member states the faculty to 
modify their national regulations concerning temporary work, on 
condition that the minimum requirements laid out in the directive are 
ensured.  
Expert opinion is that “the function of such clauses is surely to avoid, 
in direct and immediate connection with the transposition of the social 
directives, a deterioration in domestic regulations, and to promote real 
progress for protective measures, as required by the EEC Treaty”
54. It is, 
however, a common opinion that this principle does not impose a general 
standstill on member states
55: this appears to be confirmed by the overall 
formulation of the proposal and above all by Article 4, which provides for 
the need to review and, if necessary, eliminate any restrictions and limits 
on temporary work for the purpose of promoting employment, given that 
“worker protection and the promotion of employment are interests that 
can and, when the directive is implemented, must co-exist”
56.  
It must, however, be pointed out that, in the "second-generation" 
directives that take from the OMC the features of increasingly softer 
forms of regulation, setting objectives that can be moulded in a number 
of ways by the member states, the “non regression clause”, which 
maintains the typical features of hard law, is called upon to play an 
important role in balancing the directive's provisions and scope, in 
connection with both worker protection and the promotion of 
employment.  
The “non regression clause” therefore makes it possible to reconcile 
the  soft  means of regulation used by the OMC with the need to force 
member states to respect minimum protection standards without, 
however, legitimising a drop in standards in countries where existing 
legislation already provides adequate levels of protection
57. Given the 
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56 The remark, made with reference to the directive on part-time work, is by Delfino 2002, 
13. 
57 Given the necessity to guarantee EU legislation that respects national diversities, in 
accordance with the experience that led the EU to adopt the model of governance expressed 
by  the  OMC, an authoritative source (Scharpf 2002, 662) hypothesises the issuing of a 
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hybridisation of social legislation by the EES, the aim of the non 
regression clause can be seen as being that of limiting - while respecting 
the differences between the various national regulations and welfare 
systems - the effects of possible deregulation and/or the introduction of 
greater flexibility in the labour markets in member states, which some 
parts of the directive appear to be promoting
58; the clause thus 
guarantees that where – as is the case de quo - there is convergence 
between social law and an employment strategy oriented towards making 
the market or employment relationships more flexible, there must be no 
opportunity for a drop in standards. In this sense, the clause will 
facilitate, in the general formulation of the directive, the harmonisation of 
common standards in member states. In some states (e.g. the UK, etc.) 
where there is very little regulation of contracts, the directive will confine 
itself to establishing objectives and protection standards (including, as we 
have seen, the principle of non-discrimination) that can be adapted to the 
national context, thus emulating the OMC, which excludes harmonisation 
effects. In other states (e. g.  Italy, France, etc.), on the other hand, 
where worker protection and thus a high level of quality in temporary 
work are firmly guaranteed, the directive provides input for the states to 
rethink and improve existing regulations, with a view to improving 
employment rates; however, in these countries, where the non 
regression clause will find a broad sphere of application, the directive will 
also act as a way to counteract any excessive deregulation that may 
derive from an extensive interpretation of certain guidelines, thus limiting 
the possible effects of a downward harmonisation of the existing forms of 
protection. The EES, like the objectives of the directive, therefore 
proposes to activate more efficient functioning of the labour market and 
employment relationships in the member states, while the aim of the non 
regression clause is to ensure that, despite the opportunity for states to 
reconsider existing legislation in order to combine flexibility for 
companies with security for workers via new principles and techniques, 
states in which the quality of temporary work is already guaranteed will 
be obliged to maintain protection standards that are at least equivalent, if 
not the same. 
If, however, the possibility for member states to introduce different, 
perhaps more liberal, regulations concerning temporary work and the 
prohibition against lowering protection standards co-exist, it becomes of 
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crucial importance to assess possible cases in which a "general reduction 
in the level of protection" may occur. One cannot but agree with the 
opinion
59 that “the comparison cannot be accurate, but must refer to the 
very essence of protection and thus to the essential, defining parts of the 
discipline (even though, in order to achieve balance, a comparison has to 
be made between ameliorative and pejorative clauses)”. It would, in any 
case, be desirable for all states to lay maximum emphasis on the key aim 
of the proposal as a whole, that is, work of quality, evaluating any 
prospect of reform with the work quality indicators provided by the 
Commission
60. 
In the light of what has been said, the following question needs 
answering: will a state, with a provision in which it formally and explicitly 
implements a directive and its non regression clause, be able to openly 
modify existing regulations in a pejorative sense, even though they 
comply with the minimum standards? The proposal gives a number of 
evident examples of showing that this possibility is far from being a 
remote one: it is sufficient to recall the exceptions to the principle of 
equality in Article 5 and to consider the potential effects of this provision 
in systems – for example the Italian one ex Law No. 196/97  – in which 
no exceptions to the principle are admitted. Will these states be able to 
lower protection standards with the excuse that they are implementing 
the directive? Is a downward harmonisation likely to occur? The answer 
given by experts is that it is possible “but only if the economic and social 
reasons for such a modification in pejus are explicitly stated, in such a 
way that it clearly emerges as a deliberate political decision by national 
legislators”
61 who is answerable to his electorate. For the reasons given, 
however, one cannot but feel that even changes in pejus, like the ones 
mentioned above, will be limited by the impossibility for states to reduce 
the “general level of protection”; provisions of this kind can only be 
introduced as long as the overall  quality of temporary work is not 
affected. In this sense, therefore, there is nothing to prevent a member 
state from introducing exceptions to the principle of equality already in 
force, but at the same time it will have to guarantee that the quality of 
the work will remain high, for example by increasing training 
opportunities for workers at times when their terms of employment are 
less favourable or, in general, by guaranteeing greater opportunities for 
stable employment. 
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Despite the evident strengthening of the social objectives – work of 
quality as outlined in the Lisbon strategy - the process of drawing up 
regulations concerning temporary work and the prevalently soft  
instruments  proposed by the directive confirm the impression that the 
process of social integration in the EU is based on a destructured and 
many-sided juridical foundation, an impression which still does not solve 
with any certainty the problem of the real capacity to influence national 
dynamics. With a view to ensuring a combination of flexibility and 
security, the question of whether it will really be possible to achieve the 
aims of the proposal, and more generally those of employment policies, 
“without member states being forced to proportion and calibrate their 
domestic welfare and labour law systems”
62 remains largely unsolved; 
not even the attempt to strengthen the objectives of the EES through 
social legislation, in fact, fully convinces one of the concrete possibility of 
“decisively conditioning the orientations of legal policy, which are still 
mostly the result of exclusively national political dynamics”
63. In the case 
of temporary work, the perplexity is reinforced by the extreme 
complexity of the rather loosely woven model proposed by the EES, the 
highly soft nature of the provisions contained in the directive, increasing 
pressure brought to bear on the legal rules by certain interests, which 
causes them to vary considerably, and finally the evident risks connected 
with arbitrary extrapolation of pieces of the discipline
64 which may defeat 
the overall ratio  behind the model of “flexibility and security” the EU 
proposes. Given the increasing complexity of this new stage in EU 
legislation, it is not easy to foresee the interpretative contribution that 
the Court of Justice will be able to make. Detailed analysis of the 
problems connected with the role of the Court in the process of social 
integration lies beyond the scope of this paper, but some concluding 
remarks in relation to the problems dealt with above can be made. The 
Court is not likely to become a spokesman for opponents who have not 
succeeded in making their voice heard during the legislative process. Nor 
is it likely to take the place of EU legislators by attributing binding 
effectiveness to precepts that are meant to be adaptable to national 
contexts. In this respect, in fact, the opposite would seem to be true: the 
emphasis on the use of soft law in the sphere of social policy would 
appear to be destined to reduce the supplementary, creative role 
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63 Lo Faro 2002, 28. 
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traditionally played by the Court of Justice.
65 However, in the case of 
"light" regulatory intervention like that referring to flexible employment, 
a legal interpretation that supports the protection of certain fundamental 
rights is to be considered desirable, even when the room left for this 
interpretation is not clearly defined. It is evident that, given the 
increasing complexity of the models and tools of governance, the ways in 
which the Court will proceed to interpret the soft provisions contained in 
the directives concerning atypical forms of employment are still 
uncertain, thus not answering the question of whether and how the Court 
will be able to contribute, in co-operation with other institutional actors 
and through the already consolidated dialogue with national courts and 
legislators, towards the real achievement of a policy that combines 
flexibility and security. 
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